Religion and Liberal Democracy - Kathleen Sullivan
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-           "The affirmative right to practice a specific religion implies the negative right to practice none"
-           "The negative bar against establishment of religion implies the affirmative 'establishment' of a civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes"

               -This secular mechanism (the Establishment Clause) arises as a means of ending the war of all religious sects against all

               -the use of "religious grounds for resolving public moral disputes would rekindle inter-denominational strife"

                           -since religious grounds cannot be used to solve public moral issues, a civil order must be established to resolve such disputes

                                       -"the establishment of a civil public order [Liberal Democracy]",then, "was the social contract produced by religious truce"

                                       -accordingly, the baseline for measuring Free Exercise and Establishment violations is "religious liberty insofar as it is consistent with the establishment of the secular public moral order"

                                                   -the court "should take a broader view of establishment" and "a broader view of free exercise so long as religion does not genuinely threaten to undermine the secular welfare state"

-           Liberal Democracy may function as a belief system with substantive content

               -liberal democracy serves as the overarching belief system for politics, and possibly for knowledge in general

               -not a totalistic orthodoxy that would be as threatening as a religious rule

                           -is different from a religion

                                       -the content of liberal democracy is subject to continual revision in the crucible of pluralistic politics

                                                   -the beliefs within the system of Liberal Democracy change over time unlike religions which have fixed creeds

                           -"the guarantee of free speech ensures that no one may be forced to swear adherence to the culture of liberal democracy"

                           -the guarantee of free speech ensures that religious points of view can participate in public debate

-           Establishment Clause

               -"clearly forbids a government church, and with it oaths or tithes - that is, enshrinement of official religious belief or exaction of financial support for religion"

               -three degrees of government favoritism to religion

                           -coercion, endorsement, acknowledgment

                           -coercion and endorsement have not been allowed by the court

                                       -but acknowledgment has been deemed acceptable

                                                   -Sullivan believes that the "establishment of secular public order forbids government to put its imprimatur of approval on religion through any official action"

                                                               -therefore, acknowledgment of religion should not even be allowed

               -suggests two ways by which the court has allowed financial aid to religious beneficiaries

                           -"including religious beneficiaries in a scheme that also extends benefits to other comparable but nonreligious beneficiaries"

                           -"allowing private individuals to choose how to use indirect tax benefits instead of centrally directing how cash grants will be used"

               -argues that although tax-payers have a right not to finance religion, they do not have the right to choose not to finance something based on their religious beliefs"

                           -eg. "all taxpayers have a right not to subsidize religion" but "no taxpayer has a right not subsidize abortion"

-           Free Exercise Clause

               -the Court has "overwhelmingly rejected free exercise exemption claims"

               -argues that the Court should not protect "adult 'members of religious communities from the consequences of their religious choices'"

                           -religious groups should be allowed to "withdraw from regulation insofar as compatible with peaceful diarchic coexistence"

                                       -however, groups should not be allowed to opt-out from obligations to the state

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